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THE RELIGIOUS LAWYERING CRITIQUE
Bruce A. Greent
One might think about the relationship between law practice and
religion in different ways, depending on how one views either the
professional norms or religious belief and observance. Some of the most
recent academic literature on "religious lawyering" is premised on a
highly critical view of the profession's norms and a claim that religious
convictions that bear on the practice of law are incompatible with, and
preferable to, aspects of the professional norms. My purpose here is to
identify, and raise some questions about, both this critique and this
suggestion, and to show how they are in tension with other insights of
the religious lawyering literature.
A conception of the relevance of religion to lawyers' work need not
begin with a critical view of professional norms and professionalism.
On the contrary, one might start with the premise that the legal
profession's expectations for law practice are socially and morally
laudable, and perceive lawyers' religious convictions as providing
support for good lawyering. This was the understanding expressed by
Henry A. Boardman, a Presbyterian Minister, in an 1849 oration that
was surely among the earliest recorded reflections on the relevance of
religion to the work of U.S. lawyers.'
Boardman recognized the important social function served by
lawyers, and suggested that religious piety would encourage lawyers to
serve that function conscientiously.2 Although some lawyers "grossly
t Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law, New York, New York;
Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. Panelist, Professional Responsibility and the
Religious Traditions (Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 4, 2006). This article is based on the author's presentation. The author thanks Amy Uelmen
and Russell Pearce for their comments on an earlier draft of this article, and Marie Failinger for
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1. Henry A. Boardman, The Importance of Religion to the Legal Profession: With Some
Remarks on the Character of the Late Charles Chauncey, Esq. (Philadelphia, Wm. S. Martien
1849). See M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the Nineteenth Century: The "Other Tradition," 47
Kan. L. Rev. 793, 802-803 (1993) (discussing Boardman's oration in the context of other
nineteenth-century writings on the legal profession).
2. See Boardman, supra n. 1, at 8:
The Bar must always, in a country like ours, be the chief avenue of civil distinction-the
main road to posts of emolument and power.... [A] profession clothed with so lofty a
mission, needs, both for its own sake and the sake of the country, to be pervaded with a
wholesome religious sentiment. Piety alone will not, it is true, fit men to become jurists,
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misconceive[d]" their role,3 in his view, religious faith would influence
lawyers toward the proper conception.4 Religion would also help foster
the "moral qualities and habits" of a respectable, successful lawyer-"self-control, benevolence, candour, kindness of heart, and a love of
truth and justice" 5-and enable lawyers to resist temptations to depart
from proper standards of practice 6 and to act courageously in the face of
pressures to do so.7
For Boardman, religion did not define the norms of professional
practice. His understanding of the professional norms, as embodied in
the work of good lawyers, was evidently taken from then-contemporary
understandings that have largely continued to our own day.8 For
example, Boardman said that clients "should be able to repose entire
confidence in [a lawyer's] integrity," 9 and that lawyers should "deal
honestly and kindly" with their clients.'0 Although litigation should be"conduct[ed] ... throughout in a fair and honourable manner," he said,
this did not mean "that a lawyer is to assume the functions of a judge,
and take both parties under his protection."" Rather, the lawyer must
use every "legitimate means which may promise to benefit his client,"
including sometimes making arguments that he does not believe and
diplomatists, or legislators. But piety is the basis of good morals. It makes men
conscientious.
3. Boardman maintained that some lawyers, "reckless pettifoggers of the profession,"
grossly misconceive their role, viewing law not as a science or even a trade, but as a "system of
trickery":
They come to the Bar as a gambler to his club, to be honest where it is politic to be
honest, and to practice fraud and chicanery where chicanery and fraud promise larger
gains. They see nothing in a law-suit but a private dispute or quarrel, a sort of pugilistic
encounter, in which it is all one to the community who beats and who is beaten.
Id. at 10; see also id. at 16.
4. Id. at 9 ("A very little consideration will suffice to show that an intelligent, scriptural
faith, must be of great assistance in forming a just estimate of the nature and objects of the legal
profession.").
5. Id. at 12.
6. Id. at 11-12 ("It would not be easy to exaggerate the value of personal religion in the
actual practice of your profession. Whether regard be had to its temptations, its trials, or its duties,
to the dangers to be shunned or the difficulties to be met.").
7. Boardman described the lawyer's need to defend unpopular clients or causes-for
example, to prosecute an eminent individual or to defend one "who has made himself obnoxious
both to the government and the people"---even at the threat of one's own professional prospects.
Id. at 19. Whatever the personal consequences, he observed, the lawyer acting rightly "will not
betray his client." Id. at 20.
8. See generally Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics,
74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
9. Boardman, supra n. 1, at 15-16.
10. Id. at 17.
11. Id. at 18.
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exploiting the other side's technical errors.12  What the lawyer may not
do, however, is to conduct the proceedings maliciously or vindictively,
needlessly malign the opposing party's character, misrepresent facts, or
use similar means that "are incompatible with that integrity which is at
once the ornament of the Bar and the safeguard of our rights."' 3 While
there was nothing uniquely religious about these professional
expectations, and lawyers lacking in piety might conceivably accept and
live up to them, 14 Boardman's view was that religion was essential
because the pious lawyer had to think and act rightly-perhaps even
more rightly than good lawyers who lacked religious conviction. 5
Few contemporary commentators would take quite as skeptical a
view about the ability of non-pious people to be good lawyers as Rev.
Boardman's. But some have ascribed a similar supporting role to
religion, recognizing that religion may foster lawyers' efforts to achieve,
and even exceed, professional expectations that they regard as worthy.' 6
Alternatively, one might take a generally respectful, if not wholly
embracing, attitude toward the professional norms, but recognize them
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 11 (acknowledging that "right views... may undoubtedly be entertained and
acted upon by individuals who are not under the control of religious principle," but maintaining
that "it is no less obvious that they are the views which a Christian lawyer must take of his
profession." (emphasis in original)); id. at 20 (acknowledging that "[i]t would be claiming too
much for religion to affirm that this high moral courage can exist only in conne[ct]ion with
personal piety"); but see id. at 23 (asserting "that religion offers the only effectual shield against
these dangers; that a firm faith is the best of all equipments to protect the members of the
profession from those enticements to dissipation, and the more subtle enticements to dishonesty,
which have proved fatal to so many brethren").
15. Id. at 23:
My object has been to show the great value of personal religion, its professional value,
so to speak, in the practice of law. It is not denied that examples may be found at the
Bar, of eminent moral worth and distinguished success, dissociated from real piety. But
it is contended that even in cases of this sort, religion would impart an additional lustre
to the character; while its influence, if diffused throughout the body, would be most
advantageously felt in removing the prevalent vices and defects of the profession, and
augmenting all those virtues which make it one of the chief supports and ornaments of a
refined civilisation.
16. See e.g. Sadiq Reza, Religion and the Public Defender, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1051, 1065-
1066 (1999):
That religious considerations should not alter a public defender's representation of a
client to the legal detriment of the client does not mean that religion has no role in the
public defender's work. Religious imperatives and exhortations may well sustain and
inspire a public defender in his work, and help him to treat clients with the compassion
and dignity many feel is necessary to representing indigent criminal defendants.
But see Stephen Wizner, Conference: Religious Values, Legal Ethics, and Poverty Law: A
Response to Thomas Shaffer, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 37, 41 (2003) (expressing "skeptic[cism]
about religion as a source of authority and inspiration for legal ethics and the practice of law" even
for lawyers who see religion "as relevant to their professional lives").
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to be incomplete and capacious,17 and conclude that for some lawyers,
religious values, commitments and identity may therefore play a
significant role in shaping law practice within the context of those
norms. In this respect, an examination of religion's relevance to legal
practice is an aspect of several broader questions on which there is a
growing body of scholarship. One of these is the significance of
lawyers' moral, political and social values, whether they are common
and everyday values, religious values, or idiosyncratic ones. How, for
example, may lawyers express their values through their work (e.g. how
can they express their commitment to social justice through their choice
of clients and areas of practice, or through their commitment to pro bono
representation).' 8  How can lawyers bring their values to bear in
counseling clients and other work on behalf of clients,' 9 and how should
lawyers reconcile the professional rules and norms with other values
when they are in conflict? 20 Another broader question is how one can
maintain a law practice consistently with other life commitments.
Lawyers face the challenge of maintaining a balanced life in the face of
the demands of a legal practice, which may leave little time for friends
and family, culture and leisure, health and exercise, and other
commitments, including religious ones.2' Finally, what is the relevance
of personal identity to law practice-for example, the relevance of race,
class, gender, sexual orientation and/or physical disability?22  Religious
17. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 19 (1997) [hereinafter Green, Personal Values].
18. See e.g. Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement (Yale
U. Press 1993); Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 851
(2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of
the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in Cause Lawyering (Austin Sarat &
Stuart Scheingold eds., Oxford U. Press 1998); Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro
Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415, 2416-2417 (1999); William H.
Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in
the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 1099 (1994); Stephen Wizner & Jane
Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73
Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2004).
19. See e.g. Green, Personal Values, supra n. 17.
20. See e.g. Reza, supra n. 16, at 1056-1063; Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good
Client, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 319 (1987); Leslie Griffin, Legal Ethics: The Relevance of Religion to
a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1253, 1259-1261, 1277-1280 (1998).
21. See generally Bruce A. Green, Foreword, Professional Challenges in Large Firm
Practices, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 7 (2005); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and
Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 871
(1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives for Lawyers, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 2207 (2002);
Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and Its Discontents, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1335 (2000).
22. See e.g. Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity,
Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 Stan. L. Rev.
1807, 1810 (1993). On the significance of race see e.g. Roland Acevedo et al., Race and
Representation: A Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perception of the Significance of Race,
[Vol. XXI
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identity is among the aspects of personal identity that might influence a
lawyer's professional practice. 3
Much of the religious lawyering literature, proceeding from a
respectful regard for the legal profession and its norms, explores how
religious lawyers can integrate their religious convictions with their
professional practice.24 In this view, professional and religious norms
are ordinarily not antithetical, but capable of being interwoven.25
One might also explore the relevance of religion from a
comparative perspective, identifying points of similarity and
dissimilarity between religious and professional premises. Just as one
might compare the legal profession's norms in the United States with the
norms of practice in countries with different legal systems, one might
ask what Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Jewish or other religious belief
systems say about lawyers' work. In many cases, it may be doubtful
that one can answer definitively. To the extent one can, one might ask
how the norms for United States practitioners differ and how the
18 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 1 (1999-2000); Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering: Rethinking Race,
Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2081 (2005); David B. Wilkins, Identities
and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1502 (1998);
Symposium, Critical Race Lawyering, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2027 (2005). On the relevance of
gender see e.g. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman 's
Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 39 (1985). On the significance of sexual
orientation see e.g. William B. Rubenstein, In Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at
the Gay Bar, 48 Hastings L.J. 101 (1997).
23. See e.g. Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal
Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 127, 141-142 (2004);
Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional
Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577 (1993).
24. See e.g. Daniel 0. Conkle, Professing Professionals: Christian Pilots on the River of
Law, 38 Cath. Law. 151, 164 (1998) ("Christianity may affect lawyers not only in how they
generally understand or structure their professional life, but also in their day-to-day manner of
practice."); Samuel J. Levine, Introductory Note: Symposium on Lawyering and Personal Values
-Responding to the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 Cath. Law. 145, 148 (1998)
("Religious values.., present a comprehensive system of ethics for lawyers seeking to integrate
their personal and professional lives.").
25. See e.g. Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 1405, 1415 (1998); Nancy B. Rapoport, Living "Top-Down" in a "Bottom-Up" World:
Musings on the Relationship Between Jewish Ethics and Legal Ethics, 78 Neb. L. Rev. 18, 36
(1999):
How do I avoid having to choose between my two worlds? For one thing, I can say "no"
to representations that I can't stomach-a luxury that, as a law professor, I can certainly
afford. But I want to go beyond avoiding the conflict. I actually want to interweave
both worlds, and I can do that. For one thing, as a lawyer and as a Jew, I can recognize
that I'm an example in the community (both when I'm actually lawyering and when I'm
doing non-lawyering things, like shopping for groceries), and I can behave accordingly.
As a lawyer and as a Jew, I can treat people with kindness and with respect. I can enjoy
both traditions' enthusiasm for debate and interpretation--even when it comes to the
hardest question of all: who am I?
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professional norms might be better understood or critiqued by
comparison. 6
Some of the literature on "religious lawyering," however, regards
aspects of the professional norms from a highly critical perspective.
This religious lawyering critique has at least three interrelated themes:
that the professional norms are essentially hostile to personal belief and
identity; that the legal profession's "role differentiated" morality is
essentially at odds with religious and ordinary societal morality; and that
the professional norms presuppose a style of lawyering that is "amoral"
and instrumental, a style captured by the metaphor of the "hired gun."
The religious lawyering critique of the legal profession serves as a
springboard for a claim that, at least from the religious lawyer's
perspective, religious beliefs provide a better conception of what it
means to be a good lawyer.2 7 This claim, which is often implicit, is a
long way from Boardman's view more than one hundred fifty years
ago-at a time when, by some accounts, the practice of law was in a far
more challenged state than today28-that religious ideals and
professional ideals are mutually complementary. My suggestion is that
both the critique and the claim deserve closer and more critical scrutiny
than scholars on religious lawyering have given them to date.
The idea that professional norms exclude personal belief and
identity, and especially religious belief and identity, derives from an
observation made by Sanford Levinson in his 1993 article on the
professional identity of the Jewish lawyer.29 Levinson suggested that "a
particular version" of what he calls "the professionalism project"
involves "the 'bleaching out' of merely contingent aspects of the self,
including the residue of particularistic socialization that we refer to as
our 'conscience. ' '' 3  Thereafter, a broad "bleaching out" claim about the
26. See e.g. Steven H. Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: Contrasting American and Jewish
Law, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 937, 937 (2002) ("Jewish law rules provide useful guidance for the
possible amendment of America's secular legal ethics prescriptions."); Reza, supra n. 16, at 1063-
1065.
27. See Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661, 663
(2001) observing that:
[t]he more typical legal scholarly treatment [of religion and law practice]... begins by
noting an apparent crisis in the legal profession or a decline in ethics among lawyers
[and] then advises a search for virtue and goodness that religious teachings, beliefs, and
institutions can assist.
28. See generally Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America (U. Okla
Press 1965); Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to Modern Times (West 1953); but see
Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America 's Governing Class: The Formulation and Dissolution of
the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. Roundtable 381 (2001).
29. Levinson, supra n. 23.
30. Id. at 1578.
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standard conception of law practice became an article of faith in writings
on religious lawyering by my colleague Russell Pearce and others, and
was developed further.3' In a response to Levinson, Pearce maintained
that this conception that professionalism required the "bleaching out" of"religion, gender, race, and ethnicity" described not simply "a particular
version" of the lawyer's role, but "the standard conception of the
lawyer's professional role in the context of devotion to the rule of
law. 32  More recently, in an article on the religious lawyering
movement,33 Robert Vischer suggested that the standard conception of
law practice-what he characterizes as "the priesthood paradigm"-
reflects a "bleached out professionalism" under which lawyers'
personal histories, loyalties and values are replaced with the bar's"own normative standards" that "are explicitly cast in universalist
terms that purport to apply to all lawyers in all contexts.
Closely connected with the trope of "bleached out professionalism"
is the idea that professional norms demand that lawyers act amorally,
and thus, antithetically to their own religious and other moral principles.
Vischer, for one, explicitly links these ideas, referring to the legal
profession as "for the most part,.. . a gatekeeping body unified in its
devotion to the amoral, technical provision of legal services,"35 and to
the paradigm of "the amoral, 'bleached out' lawyer-that is,.. . [the]
call for 'a lawyer [to be] willing to diligently represent a client
irrespective of any personal, moral, or ideological affinity between
them.' 36 In turn, Vischer links the profession's conception that lawyers
may pursue lawful means and ends that contradict their own "vision of
the good" to the profession's
paradigm [of] role-differentiated morality, under which "behavior
that is potentially criticizable on moral grounds is blocked from
such criticism by an appeal to the existence of the actor's role
31. See e.g. Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66 Fordham L.
Rev. 1469, 1489 (1998) [hereinafter Lesnick, Religious Lawyer]; Pearce & Uelmen, supra n. 23,
at 142-145; Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1259, 1269-
1270 (1996); Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and Identity Conflicts in Legal
Representation, 14 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights. L. Rev. 143, 152 (2004); Amelia J. Uelmen, An
Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic Legal Education: Why Rock the Boat?,
81 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 921, 924-925 (2004) [hereinafter Uelmen, Faith and Justice].
32. Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson,
14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1627 (1993) [hereinafter Pearce, Jewish Lawyering].
33. Robert K. Vischer, Heretics in the Temple of Law: The Promise and Peril of the Religious
Lawyering Movement, 19 J. L. & Relig. 427 (2004).
34. Id. at 433 (quoting Levinson, supra n. 23, at 1578, and Wilkins, supra n. 22, at 1504).
35. Id. at431.
36. Id. at 435 (quoting Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2003)); see also Conkle, supra n. 24, at 152.
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which, it is claimed, makes the moral difference. 3 7
Some religious lawyering scholars perceive the standard professional
morality as not simply tolerant of work that contradicts a lawyer's moral
viewpoint, but as requiring it; the professional ideology, in their view,
all but demands that lawyers serve as "hired guns. 38
If professionalism is the illness, in this account, religion can be the
cure: For religious lawyers, religious values should not simply reinforce
professional norms (as in Boardman's account) or supplement them (as
in the view of those seeking to integrate religious and professional
norms) or provide an occasion for reflection on them (as comparativists
might propose), but, to some extent, supplant them.3 9 This presupposes
that religious principles are different from professional ideals as well as,
presumably, from garden-variety, everyday societal values. But in what
way? Some of the literature suggests how highly particular religious
beliefs may conflict with professional obligations, such as when a
lawyer who is religiously opposed to abortion is compelled to represent
a minor who is seeking judicial authorization for an abortion without
parental consent.4 °  But these kinds of conflicts are both rare41 and
avoidable.42 Indeed, one of the leading proponents of the religious
37. Vischer, supra n. 34, at 443 (quoting Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in The
Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics 25, 28 (David Luban, ed., Rowman &
Allanheld 1983)).
38. See e.g. Joseph G. Allegretti, The Lawyer's Calling: Christian Faith and Legal Practice
(Paulist Press 1996); Pearce & Uelmen, supra n. 23, at 148-151; Vischer, supra n. 33 at 441
(citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 Yale L.J. 1239, 1278-1279 (1991))
(identifying Brougham with "the legal profession's narrative").
39. See Russell G. Pearce, Persons of Faith and the Practice of Law: Faith and the Lawyer's
Practice, 75 St. John's L. Rev. 277, 279 (2001) (observing that the religious lawyering movement
is divided between those who "believe[] that religious lawyering can exist with professionalism,
and indeed can be mutually supportive" and those who "believe[] that religious lawyering and
professionalism are inevitably in conflict and that professionalism should be rejected"); Vischer,
supra n. 33, at 429 (observing that religious lawyers' "primary loyalty is not to the profession's
stated vision of the good lawyer, but to their faith tradition's stated vision of the good person").
40. See e.g. Lesnick, Religious Lawyer, supra n. 31; Vischer, supra n. 33, at 429; see also
Jennifer Tetenbaum Miller, Note, Free Exercise v. Legal Ethics: Can a Religious Lawyer
Discriminate in Choosing Clients?, 13 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 161 (1999).
41. But see Vischer, supra n. 33, at 429 (referring to "the frequent overlap between the
compulsions of faith and the compulsions of the profession").
42. For example, a recent article by Katherine Kruse explores the clash between the moral
beliefs of a lawyer and client in the context of a scenario in which a lesbian couple seeking advice
on how to use the law to best structure their family relationship to benefit their future child seeks
assistance from a family lawyer who is morally and religiously opposed to homosexuality.
Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 Minn. L. Rev.
389, 409 (2005). Kruse argues compellingly for a "moral conflict of interest standard" which"would prohibit lawyers from representing clients with whom they fundamentally disagree on
moral grounds." Id. at 458. Earlier, I explored the moral disagreement between a lawyer and
client in the context of a scenario in which a woman seeking exclusive custody of her child retains
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lawyering critique, my colleague Amy Uelmen, has described such
examples as caricatures of religious lawyering.43 The religious values
that she and others put forth are more abstract and broadly applicable to
professional practice, such as "concern for the common good,' 44
"honesty and integrity,"45 and "decency and courtesy.4 6  Even harsh
critics of professionalism would concede the affinity between
professional norms and certain religious principles, such as the
commitment to "equal justice under the law," and "concern for the poor
and powerless., 47  But the suggestion-and here, there is some kinship
with Boardman-is that, at the very least, religious doctrine provides a
moral framework that is more robust than the one that many bring to
their work as lawyers,48 and that religious lawyers are more strongly
committed to their personal belief system than secular lawyers.4 9
Both the descriptive and normative premises of the religious
lawyering critique have been challenged in the past. Descriptively, it is
not at all clear that the profession has ever endorsed the most extreme
view of advocacy: Ted Schneyer long ago challenged the assumption
that the "hired gun" is the profession's standard conception of the
a lawyer whose religious conviction (like that of a New Jersey judge on whom the scenario is
based) is that children should be accessible to both parents. I suggested that family law might not
be the appropriate area of practice for one holding such beliefs. Green, Personal Values, supra n.
17, at 36-38. See also Israel M. Greisman, The Jewish Criminal Lawyer's Dilemma, 29 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 2413 (2002) (arguing that Jewish doctrine would make it virtually impossible to serve as
a criminal defense lawyer).
43. Amelia J. Uelmen, Can a Religious Person Be a Big Firm Litigator?, 26 Fordham Urb.
L.J. 1069, 1088-1089 (1999) [hereinafter Uelmen, Religious Person]; see also Larry 0. Natt
Gantt, Ethical Guideposts for the Christian Attorney: Integration as Integrity: Postmodernism,
Psychology, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16
Regent U. L. Rev. 233, 256 (2003-04); Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be Saved? The
Theological Legal Ethics of Thomas Shaffer, 10 J. L. & Relig. 347, 352 (1993-94), discussing
Thomas Shaffer's insight that the "[e]xcessive concentration on such dilemmas diverts ethicists
(and jurists) from what the ancients took to be our foremost concern: character, virtue, and
formation in the virtues").
44. Uelmen, Religious Person, supra n. 43, at 1094.
45. Conkle, supra n. 24, at 165.
46. Id.
47. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering, supra n. 32, at 1269.
48. Uelmen, Faith and Justice, supra n. 31, at 929:
When it comes to analyzing the implications of ordinary day-to-day work, many lawyers
lack a robust intellectual framework which would help to challenge, or at least think
about, how their work impacts the common good and the poor. For a few sensitive and
inquiring souls, direct contact with poverty and injustice may be sufficient to provoke
the kind of intellectual inquiry and moral reflection that will equip them for a probing
structural critique.
49. Vischer, supra n. 33, at 447 ("A morally agnostic approach to clients is untenable when
moral beliefs are not viewed simply as a matter of personal preference, but as having undeniable
truth value.").
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lawyer's role.5°  I have previously suggested that it is a vast
overstatement to say of the professional norms that they leave no room
for lawyers' personal morality,51 and, as William Simon has argued, it is
doubtful that lawyers can help but bring their personal values to bear on
their representations. 52  The question is simply the extent to which
lawyers can, should, and do draw on personal values, religious or
otherwise. Norman Spaulding has argued that lawyers bring too much
of themselves, not too little, to their work.53 He challenges attributions
of lawyer dissatisfaction to "the professional ideal endorsed by the rules
of professional conduct [which] envisions a lawyer willing to diligently
represent a client irrespective of any personal, moral, or ideological
affinity between them," and argues, on the contrary, that lawyers'
malaise is often attributable to their over-identification with clients'
objectives.54
On the other hand, from a normative perspective, as Boardman
recognized, personal values should not be given full play. David
Wilkins has defended the idea of deference to professional morality in
the context of discussing black lawyers' race-based moral obligations,55
and Daniel Markovits argues in a forthcoming article that the legitimacy
of adjudication depends on lawyers' maintaining substantial professional
detachment from their private views of the morality of their clients'
claims.56 I would add that, even from the perspective of what Pearce has
50. Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L.
Rev. 1529, 1567 ("attack[ing] the claim that lawyers generally adhere to a Standard Conception of
legal ethics which motivates them to act for their clients up to the limits of the law and without
regard for the interests of anyone but their clients"); see also Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for
the Hired Gun, 41 J. Leg. Educ. 11 (1991); Zacharias & Green, supra n. 8, at 15-16 & n. 95.
51. See Green, Personal Values, supra n. 17.
52. Simon, supra n. 18, at 1102 ("[E]ffective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in
terms of their own values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments.").
53. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 6-7
(2003).
54. Id.
55. See Wilkins, supra n. 22, at 1590-1591:
First, the model insists that professional obligations carry independent moral weight.
Black lawyers, like all lawyers, must take these obligations seriously. Second, all
legitimate racial obligations must be derived from, and ultimately be subservient to,
common morality. Racial obligations are therefore no excuse for race-based oppression.
Third, in cases where there is an unavoidable conflict between a black lawyer's racial
obligations and her professional commitments, it is the legitimate social purposes
underlying her professional obligations that must eventually carry the day. Racial
solidarity, in other words, can never undermine the legitimate (as opposed to the self-
interested) demands of professionalism. Fourth, to the extent that a black lawyer finds it
impossible to conform to these demands, she must.. . express her disagreement in ways
that ultimately support the moral force of the professional norm.
56. Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority ofAdudication, 75 Fordham L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
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dubbed the "religious lawyering movement,""7 there is reason to
question the religious lawyering critique, which is to say that the
academic thinking on the broad theme of religious lawyering may be not
just varied but divided.
First, the claim that professional norms bleach out personal identity
is overstated. To be sure, law practice limits opportunities for self-
expression. It is not alone in that regard. Virtually all work comes with
shared expectations and limitations. Few who work for a living have the
latitude to fully express their personal beliefs and characteristics in their
work. A plastic surgeon cannot indulge her aesthetic preferences by
rearranging a patient's features without permission. A waiter cannot
criticize a diner's order on moral grounds ("it's bad enough that you're
eating meat, but veal?!"). Lawyers who wear suits to court are hardly
the only ones in a uniform. But it is not necessarily the "project" of"professionalism" to seek to obliterate personal identity and belief. And
anyone who has been around lawyers for a while knows that, in fact,
their personal characteristics are not "bleached out.""8 That is proven, in
part, by those lawyers in the "religious lawyering movement" who have
found ways to integrate religious faith with professional practice.5 9 In
many respects, lawyers' ability to express their personal identity is
probably less a product of professionalism and professional norms than
of the particular workplaces in which some lawyers choose to practice-
e.g. large corporate law firms.6°
Second, one cannot make the case that the lawyer's professional
role is "amoral" simply by pointing to role differentiation and the
identification of particular norms with particular roles. Role
differentiation and role morality are necessary to any professional
pursuit and are not invariably antithetical to morality. Indeed, they
would seem to be as much a part of religious belief systems as other
societal belief systems. Religious doctrine identifies particular
expectations for how people conduct themselves in parent-child, master-
servant, and other relationships. Secular laws presuppose, and respect,
that certain religious doctrine demands confidentiality in
communications between a priest and penitent when it might not
57. Russell G. Pearce, The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal
Ethics and Professionalism, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1075 (1998).
58. See Rapoport, supra n. 25, at 26-28 (questioning how extensively "bleaching out"
occurs).
59. See supra nn. 24-25 and accompanying text.
60. See e.g. Amelia J. Uelmen, The Evils of "Elasticity ": Reflections on the Rhetoric of
Professionalism and the Part-Time Paradox in Large Firm Practice, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 81
(2005); Uelmen, Faith and Justice, supra n. 31.
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demand confidentiality in communications between others.61  To be
sure, when it comes to particularly tough questions, such as where to
strike the balance between confidentiality and the protection of third
parties, religious conventions may come out differently from
professional ones, just as bar organizations may disagree among
themselves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But the notion that
professional roles imply a distinctive set of norms hardly seems hostile
or foreign to moral beliefs.
Third, as Boardman well understood, it is not necessarily "amoral"
for lawyers to implement their clients' lawful instructions or to seek to
achieve their clients' objectives even while having moral qualms about
the means or ends. That is very different from the rare situation where a
lawyer might be faced with carrying out an objective that she believes to
be gravely wrong, in which case, the lawyer generally can and should
avoid or terminate the representation. 62 Many people--doctors, waiters,
carpenters, teachers, even clergy-serve those with whom they find
fault. One would think that there is a moral good to feeding the hungry
and healing the sick, even those who, after they are fortified or
recovered, will do bad things. Moreover, the legitimacy of the moral
dialogue advocated by those writing from the religious lawyering
perspective63 and others,64 would seem to depend, to some degree, on the
lawyer's willingness to accept the client's decision at the end of the
dialogue, rather than putting the client to the choice of accepting the
lawyer's moral view or losing the lawyer's services.
Fourth, while it is true that professional norms are not expressed in
explicitly religious terms, and often are not expressed in moral terms,
that is generally true of the norms of any non-religious enterprise, be it
medicine, journalism, or construction work. But it does not follow that
lawyers' work itself cannot express religious or other moral convictions
or that lawyers cannot bring their moral beliefs to their work. Beyond
that, to help someone with a legal problem achieve a lawful end by
lawful means is a good in itself. And, as the religious lawyering
61. See generally Robert John Araujo, S.J., International Tribunals and Rules of Evidence:
The Case for Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent" Privilege Under International
Law, 15 Am. U. Intl. L. Rev. 639 (2000). But see Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: WhyA Rabbi
and a Jewish Lawyer Must Disclose a Client Confidence, 29 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1771 (1996)
(describing Jewish understanding, which does not recognize confidentiality).
62. See supra n. 42.
63. See e.g. Lesnick, Religious Lawyer, supra n. 31, at 1496-1497; Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer &
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility 94-134 (West 1994).
64. Robert Dinerstein et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client
Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary, 10 Clin. L. Rev. 755 (2004).
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literature acknowledges, there is a nobility to performing the work
well. 65
Fifth, it is not at all clear that the abstract religious virtues that are
thought to improve law practice are so different from widely shared
societal values, even if there are nuances of difference in how they are
understood.66 Nor is it clear that the religious virtues are so different
from those that have been promoted by the organized bar under the
rubric of "professionalism., 67  Many in the religious lawyering
movement, at least on the academic side, have sought common ground
among those with different experiences and perspectives 68-an endeavor
with which the legal profession often finds accord.69 That being so, it is
hard to see why some of the religious lawyering scholarship emphasizes
the differences between religious values and either professional values
or common societal values rather than what they have in common.
Given the genesis of the professional norms in writings of the
nineteenth century professional elite, many of whom no doubt met
Boardman's standard of religious piety, and many of whom drew little
distinction between religious, societal and professional morality, one
would not expect the differences between religious and professional
morality to be terribly sharp. And one might expect that many people
are drawn to the practice of law precisely because of the opportunities it
provides to serve a sense of the good that would resonate with religious
and secular lawyers alike. Rather than stress differences, I would
second Carrie Menkel-Meadow's observation that
[w]hatever the discipline from which we choose to recognize our
values.... all of us... share a sense that our professional practice
should be informed with human significance, meaning, and "good"
values [which] enhance human flourishing, promote respect for
others, allow us to recognize our human commonalities and
connections as well as our individual differences, and enable us,
through our own actions, to make the world a better place than we
65. See e.g. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Can the Ordinary Practice of Law Be a
Religious Calling?, 32 Pepp. L. Rev. 373, 374 (noting "that most religious traditions accept the
notion that all productive work can be a religious calling").
66. For a response to this point, see Pearce & Uelmen, supra n. 23, at 152-153.
67. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 Gonz. L. Rev.
393 (1990).
68. See e.g. Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith
Conference, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1075 (1998); Robert Reber et al., Rediscovering the Role of
Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent, Panel Discussion: Can We Find
Common Ground as Religiously Committed Lawyers, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 961 (1999).
69. See e.g. Bruce A. Green, Foreword, Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional Issues
in the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1713, 1735 (1999).
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found it.70
Which brings me to my final point: It is not so clear that if
professionalism is the problem, religion is the solution. At a level of
generality, professionalism and religious belief are not in conflict. One
can bring one's values--commitment to social justice, concern for the
less fortunate, respect for others, integrity, humility-to one's work as a
lawyer. It is at the level of particularity where the perceived conflict
presumably arises-e.g. how does one counsel a particular client or
interact with a particular witness in light of a commitment to "love of
neighbor." The process of figuring out what one's religious world view
says about the specifics of legal practice can be a complex one; on the
particular questions, in the course of reflection it may be hard for
religious lawyers to determine what answer religious beliefs offer
precisely because religious beliefs did not originate specifically with an
eye to law practice, much less twenty-first-century United States law
practice.7 Different answers may be derived not only from different
religious faiths but from different understandings of the same faith. In
contrast, professional understandings develop over time through
dialogue among lawyers of differing faiths and no faith, who are seeking
to derive the best understandings about how lawyers should conduct
themselves in a concrete system of law and practice. At the margins,
there is room for disagreement. But why would one assume that the
answer that any individual lawyer derived from his or her personal
understanding of religious faith, or even the answer that any group of
same-faith lawyers derived from their collective understanding, will be
better? Better it may be for them, because they may have greater loyalty
to their understanding of the tenets of their faith than to those of the
legal profession, as would be true even if one did not perceive a crisis in
professional norms and values. But it is far from clear that the answers
would be better from the public perspective, from the profession's
perspective, or even from the perspective of lawyers with differing
personal moral and religious perspectives.
By focusing on the conflict between religious and professional
norms, the religious lawyering critique raises the possibility that it is
simply not enough for religious lawyers to avoid, or withdraw from,
70. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, And Now a Word About Secular Humanism, Spirituality, and the
Practice of Justice and Conflict Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1073, 1079 (2001).
71. On the communal effort to explore the religious and moral significance of a lawyer's
work see e.g. Howard Lesnick, No Other Gods: Answering the Call of Faith in the Practice of
Law, 18 J. L. & Relig. 459, 465 (2002-03); Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and Jurisprudence
from Within Religious Congregations, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 961 (2001); Vischer, supra n. 34.
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those rare representations in which their fundamental beliefs are at odds
with their clients' objectives. If the different norms are more generally
irreconcilable, perhaps religious people must not practice law at all.
This suggestion challenges the assumption that many bring to the
dialogue on religious lawyering about the ability to integrate religious
and professional norms. This is to say that the religious lawyering
critique, while explicitly challenging aspects of lawyer professionalism,
implicitly challenges a core premise of the religious lawyering
movement itself. So it would be understandable if many of the writers
on religious lawyering feel discomfort with a rhetoric that offers religion
as an antidote to the profession's ideal of the good lawyer rather than
beginning with the professional ideal and, like Boardman, encouraging
lawyers to be even better.

